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Introduction 
Over the years, there has been a significant debate over the ethics of 
making active voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide available 
for terminally ill patients, coming with increasing arguments on their moral 
adequacy. There is an increasing tendency to write in favor of accepting 
the morality of euthanasia in an effort to form public consensus. By 
physician-assisted suicide it is meant that the physician provides the means 
for a patient to end his or her life. By active euthanasia it is meant that the 
physician personally administers a lethal drug. Death will be caused in 
order to end a life of suffering, because the patient does not want to 
continue living, or because life has deteriorated into a minimal condition 
that cannot be considered dignified. 
The considerable advancement of medicine in the last several years 
has led to the question of whether it is obligatory to use all possible means 
to keep a person alive, in other words, if we are to use all available therapy 
even when there is little chance of success. 
In this context there has appeared the question of a right to die with 
dignity. For some, dying with dignity means dying without pain. Any 
death that is accompanied by suffering is considered undignified. Death 
can be induced by the administration of a drug with the intention of ending 
the life as well as the suffering. Active life-ending interventions are 
selected with the aim of quickly ending the patient's life when there is no 
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possibility of a cure and the patient has manifested his desire not to 
continue living. For many others the right to die with dignity implies the 
removal of life support systems or the withdrawal of treatment from 
terminally ill patients in order to allow them to succumb to the underlying 
disease, thus freeing the patient from the slavery of overtreatment. 
There has been a debate over the reach of the term "euthanasia." In 
the past, the concept of euthanasia has been divided into active and passive. 
By passive euthanasia it is meant to hasten the death of a patient by 
removing life support equipment or by stopping medical procedures or 
treatment. By active euthanasia it is meant to induce death by the 
application of a lethal agent. 
However, from the point of view of professional ethics it is irrelevant 
whether the life of a patient is taken by act or by omission of a necessary 
treatment. In both cases, death is induced intentionally. Rather, the 
definition of euthanasia must be understdod as deliberately ending the life 
of a patient who is suffering or has an incurable disease, when requested by 
either the patient or the family.' Here, omission is taken to mean the 
deprivation of a medical treatment that is considered valid and necessary 
for the patient to live. 
On the other hand, it is not euthanasia to refrain from medically futile 
treatment, or to remove unnecessary life support systems, allowing the 
patient to succumb to the underlying disease, or in death induced by 
"double-effect" drugs that are given to relieve suffering, but may also 
shorten life. There is no obligation to undergo or to prolong a treatment 
that is considered futile by the medical profession. The practice of 
hastening death with palliative care interventions to relieve the terminally 
ill patient ' s pain, suffering, and other symptoms is accepted as ethical and 
legal, provided the intention of the physidan is to relieve pain and other 
symptoms and not to hasten death .2 
Physicians are considered the logical candidates to seek for help in 
dying since, for many terminally ill patients, assistance in dying is seen as 
an extension of relief from suffering and as a form of caring, consistent 
with the profession.3 Furthermore, it is already being done. According to 
anonymous polls, 13 to 19 percent of physicians in the United States have 
participated in physician-assisted suicide.4 Oregon has become the first 
state to legalize physician-assisted suicide. 
In this paper, I am going to analyze and critique the arguments in 
favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in order to make an 
ethical judgment in the question of whether there exists a right to commit 
suicide or to request euthanasia for terminally ill patients. 
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Reasons Given in Favor of Euthanasia 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide 
1) The argument of poor quality of life. Those who advocate euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide argue that in some circumstances living is 
worse than dying, that the pain and suffering caused by a terminal disease 
may make life so agonizing and unbearable that death may seem "an act of 
humanity" and physician-assisted suicide a way to die with dignity.5 The 
physician will act under the principle of beneficence to relieve the pain and 
suffering of terminally ill patients. For the dying patient, suffering may go 
far beyond pain. This includes: progressive loss of activity, mobility and 
freedom, increasing helplessness and dependence on others, physical 
discomforts such as nausea, dyspnea, inability to swallow or talk, fear of 
dying, incontinence, weakness, loss of dignity, and dementia.6 Life loses 
all quality and meaning to the point that death is preferable. 
2) Respect for autonomous persons demands recognition of their right 
to decide how they will live their lives. This includes the dying process, 
the ability to choose one's own destiny. We have the right to avoid 
intolerable suffering and exert control over the way we die. Some authors 
believe there is a right to commit suicide and, therefore, to be free of 
unreasonable restrictions on the means by which one can exercise this 
right.7 Battin has argued that there is an unequally distributed, but 
fundamental, right to suicide which we have because it can be constitutive 
of human dignity, at least in a negative sense, when life becomes 
unbearable.8 The patient's right to self-determination has been a most 
central argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide.9 Often it is 
assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request 
another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death. lo Even 
with adequate palliative care there are cases in which it is not possible to 
avoid the suffering. II 
3) The principle of beneficence, compassion with the suffering. This 
has been used as an argument in favor of euthanasia. 12 In this way, · 
euthanasia is considered a virtuous act. The nonabandonment of the patient 
has been part of the traditional care provided by physicians. Physician-
assisted suicide must be judged in light of this ethical principle of 
nonabandonment. 
4) The experiment with euthanasia in Holland. This is regarded as 
successful by the general public and the medical profession in that country. 
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5) The public stigma attached to suicide is decreasing. In most 
jurisdictions, suicide is a legal act, and has been so for decades. Most 
suicides are seen as resulting from temporary mental illness, usually 
depression,14 but the reason that terminally ill patients desire to shorten the 
process of dying is to terminate their suffering. This raises the concept of 
rational suicide. A person who is terminally ill may not be able to exercise 
the option of suicide because of mental or physical limitations. In a way, 
they are being discriminated against because of their disability, given that 
able-bodied people have the option. 
6) The distinction between "passive" and "active" euthanasia has been 
criticized for dependence on problematic conceptions of causation and 
on the belief that the sheer difference between killing and letting die is 
morally relevant. From the patient's point of view, discontinuing life 
support measures and active voluntary euthanasia are similar in that the 
fundamental desire is for an earlier and more comfortable death. The 
intention is morally irrelevant in the evaluation of the morality of the 
action. They are also similar morally in that both are done with the intent 
of ending life. 15 In the case in which discontinuing supportive measures 
and allowing the patient to die produces days or weeks of extreme 
discomfort, active euthanasia seems to be morally preferable. 16 For some, 
discontinuing a ventilator cannot be considered a refusal of treatment, but a 
request to be killed. 17 For Patrick Hopkins18 there is no metaphysical, 
essential, and intrinsic moral difference between machines and natural 
bodily organs, so that omitting treatment is a form of killing since we 
deprive the person of an organ that can only function with the aid of a 
machine or medical technology and that we need to set aside our prejudices 
against the artificial, and extend the option of good killing (active 
euthanasia) to those trapped by nature. If our society recognizes that life 
can be sufficiently burdensome on life-sustaining treatments, such as a 
respirator or dialysis machine, and that this medical intervention can be 
withdrawn or withheld (what some call passive euthanasia), then it can be 
sufficiently burdensome to justify active euthanasia. 
7) The principle of double effect is a form of active euthanasia. 
Physicians are allowed to give increasing doses of narcotics when there is a 
severe pain or, it is presumed, with the knowledge that these drugs depress 
respiration and could hasten death.19 
8) John Hardwig has argued that when modern medicine allows us to 
survive far longer than we can take care of ourselves, there is a duty or 
responsibility to die in consideration of our loved ones, so as not to 
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impose crushing burdens on them.2o In a time when total medical 
funding is restricted and being continually reduced, it may not be ethical to 
engage in extremely expensive treatment of terminally ill people. 
Responses to the Arguments 
1) Quality of life issues are confused with the value that the quality of 
life has. Quality of life issues have a strong subjective component. Very 
easily the health care professional will substitute his/her quality of life 
standard for that of the patient. Human life has an intrinsic value. Good 
health cannot give dignity to human life because health does not possess 
life in itself, rather it participates in life. The dignity of the person cannot 
be erased by illness. Rather, loss of dignity is imputed to the patient by 
reactions of caregivers and family to the patient' s plight or appearance. 
2) The terminally ill patient is in an extremely vulnerable position, so 
that his/her autonomy is diminished, suffering from depression, 
anxiety, fear, dejection, rejection, and/or guilt. Under these conditions, 
it is very difficult to have a clear conscience and some will almost blindly 
follow the suggestions of a physician. To bring about death by euthanasia 
is not within the competence of the medical profession. Physician-assisted 
suicide is not consistent with the doctor's pledge to heal and treat. 
Physician-assisted suicide is against the traditional ethical codes 
(Hippocratic, World Health Association, AMA). It will lead to a distrust in 
physicians. Furthermore, we do not have a right to commit suicide, for the 
simple reason that life does not belong completely to us. No one can say 
that he/she has given life to himself/herself. Recently in two unanimous 
decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to 
constitutionalize the "right to death with dignity" (26 June 1997, 
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quilf). In these, the plaintiffs 
contended that the statutes violated their patients' Fourteenth Amendment 
"liberty interest," so that there is a constitutionally recognized "right to die" 
that outweighs the state's interest in preventing suicide by "terminally ill 
competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths with medication 
prescribed by their physicians." Not all intimate choices about one's life 
qualifY as protected rights. 
3) The compassion that is talked about by the proponents of 
euthanasia reflects a distorted view. True compassion does not eliminate 
the sufferer, but seeks to relieve the cause of the suffering. Otherwise, the 
life of the patient is devalued. Besides, compassion is a spiritual quality, 
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which means "suffering with," to be presented to the sufferer. It is not a 
principle or a self-justifying reason. 
4) The experience of the Netherlands has shown the reality of the 
slippery slope. There have been successive steps in relaxation of criteria: 
extension to non-terminal patients, minors, Down syndrome, patients with 
mental suffering, severe depression, dementia, involuntary euthanasia 
"under certain conditions," and non-terminal AIDS patients.21 
5) It is not the same to commit suicide as it is to aid in a suicide. The 
latter is a form of homicide, even if the underlying reason is compassion. 
Though attempting suicide has lately been decriminalized, the state ' s 
interest in preventing it has not wavered, including penalizing those who 
aid in the attempt. No matter how ill a person is, he is still among the 
living and therefore has a right to live. Data suggest that the interest of 
patients in euthanasia stems, in the majority of cases, to depression or 
psychological distress, rather than pain. This suggests that much of the 
debate about euthanasia is misplaced, since it focuses on pain and the use 
of euthanasia for pain relief, when in fact pain does not seem to be the 
primary motive.22 Suffering of psychological origin can also be relieved 
with adequate counseling and psychiatric intervention. With proper 
support, including pain relief, psychological and spiritual therapy, and 
friendship, the patient can die in a dignified way as a member of the human 
family. No present-day legislation allows for help in committing suicide 
for a person who is going through a period of depression. Rather, their 
depression would be treated. To legalize physician-assisted suicide would 
contribute to desensitization to killing throughout all of society. 
6) There is a special relationship between the doctor and patient. An 
omission of an act, if it brings about harm, may bring legal liability. If a 
competent patient refuses consent to treatment or continued treatment, the 
legal effect is that the physician is absolved from his or her duty by the 
patient. The physician terminates the treatment, but the subsequent death is 
caused by the underlying disease which the physician no longer has 
authority to treat. The physician is not killing the patient but letting him 
die. Ordinarily no one is under a duty to help a neighbor, such omissions to 
act bring no liability.23 
We cannot forbid the voluntary acceptance of a death which medical 
intervention can only postpone. What is forbidden is unlawful killing. 
Often in the dialogue there is a confusion between passive euthanasia and 
euthanasia by omission. The latter brings legal liability but the former does 
not since natural deaths are not killing and thus are neither illegal nor 
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immoral and do not confer responsibility. In this sense, it will be helpful if 
the term "passive euthanasia" is avoided while we retain the qualification 
of euthanasia by omission, which implies a negligent act. An example that 
intention has its place in moral life is that when the person does not die 
after removal of the treatment, the person is left alive. This is not satisfied 
by assisted suicide. It is one thing to desire death and bring this about 
actively, and another to desire death and allow it to occur. It is one thing to 
respect the will of the patient to reject treatment and another to take his life. 
It is not merely a psychological difference, but also a moral one. To allow 
someone to die of a disease for which we are not responsible and cannot 
cure is to allow the disease to be the cause of death. The intention of 
allowing one to die is compassion and not death, while the intention of 
active euthanasia is death as a means for compassion.24 
Conclusions about causation simply reflect judgments about the right 
place to assign responsibility. When a person turns off a life-supporting 
respirator without authority it is clear that he is causing the patient' s death. 
But when a physician follows the patient ' s directions to disconnect a 
respirator he has not acted wrongfully, since he has no duty to continue 
treatment against the patient's wishes, even though this is causally related 
to the patient' s death. 
It is not dignified to continue aggressive treatment of the patient when 
there are no possibilities of cure (futile treatment).25 A futile treatment 
does not produce a benefit any longer to the patient, but damage.26 It is not 
the same thing to help to live someone who is living as it is to prevent to 
die someone who is dying. A treatment is considered futile if it only 
preserves unconsciousness or does not allow an end to dependency on the 
intensive care unit. Quantitatively, a physician can consider a treatment 
futile when the empirical data demonstrate that it has less than 1% 
probability of being beneficial to the patient. 27 Life and death issues cannot 
be decided with absolute certainty, simply because there is no strict and 
specific relation between the etiology and the disease. Our knowledge of 
an empirical reality is always approximate, probable. We cannot ask a 
physician for an absolute degree of certainty in his or her decisions. 
Nevertheless, it is the decision of the patient to continue with a futile 
treatment, since there is no absolute certainty. For an act of omission to be 
euthanasic the treatment omitted or withdrawn must be a useful one, not a 
futile one. 
7) Optimal palliative care could provide adequate pain relief for most 
terminally ill patients.28 Inpatient hospice units provide an example of 
supportive measures at the end of life with comfort care rendering 
superfluous any consideration of physician-assisted suicide. To legalize 
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physician-assisted suicide would divert attention away from pain relief and 
palliative care. The easy road for the health care professional is to be free 
from frustration, hostility and anguish that come from "hopeless" cases. 
The issue of hastening death with palliative care interventions for 
terminally ill patients is accepted as ethical and legal, provided the 
intention of the physician is to relieve pain and other symptoms and not to 
hasten death.29 A disproportionate sedation can cause interruption of 
feeding and hydration of the patient, who will die of hunger or thirst in a 
state of unconsciousness, or will die of overdose. In this case, euthanasia 
can be hidden and is effected by an omission that leads to the patient's 
death by hunger. Ethically, the physician must look for pain relief that will 
carry less risk and still free the patient from unnecessary suffering. 
8) To allow physician-assisted suicide would leave an impact on other 
sufferers who are ill, aged, or weak. This would devalue their lives and 
they may undergo assisted suicide under pressure. Further pressure is 
exercised if there are economical constraints. This undermines the call to 
generosity to those who surround the patient, who must free the patient 
from extra pressures. 
Ethical Reflections 
Practically all religious traditions, including groups such as 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews, consider life as a gift from God, to be given 
and taken at the time of His choosing. Suicide can never be an option. 
Aristotle affirmedJO that suicide is an unjust act and cannot be allowed, not 
because it goes against the individual, but because it goes against the 
community. Human life has value and dignity in and of itself because it is 
the life of a person. Physical life is constitutive of the person and a 
condition for his existence, is the fundamental value of the person, and 
therefore cannot be valued, taking as criteria minor and relative values, nor 
can it be relegated to the disposition of others.3 1 Besides, Christians 
believe that God supports people in suffering and, therefore, to actively 
seek an end to one ' s life would represent a lack of trust in God' s promise. 
Also, as Christians we have an obligation to support and be with those who 
are suffering and we believe that suffering brings us closer to Christ, 
identifying us with His cross and participating in redemption. Part of the 
problem with the present debate over euthanasia is that no value is given to 
suffering. Even considering that life can become unbearable, the final 
word is that life cannot be taken . Suicide is not ethical. 
The question that has been raised is whether believers have the right 
to take their own personal beliefs and extend them to the entire population, 
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including secularists, atheists, and agnostics. I will argue that they do in 
this case, since believers are not saying anything that a non-believer could 
not accept as rational. Both believers and non-believers agree with the 
common conception that life and death are given to us. Not everything is 
autonomous in the human being. We do not give life to ourselves, we have 
received it from our parents. Therefore we do not have absolute dominion 
over our own lives and we cannot take them. We must distinguish between 
possessing something, such as our lives, and assuming it. We have 
received our lives, life is not an object that we possess, rather, we are 
responsible for what we do with our lives and we are able to choose 
options. These possibilities make us able to assume our lives. We are 
personal living beings, but we do not possess our lives as we would an 
object. 
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